A new hash function HeW: A hash function based on light weight block cipher FeW is proposed in this paper. The compression function of HeW is based on block cipher FeW. It is believed that key expansion algorithm of block cipher slows down the performance of the overlying hash function. Thereby, block ciphers become a less favourable choice to design a compression function. As a countermeasure, we cut down the key size of FeW from 80-bit to 64-bit and provide a secure and efficient key expansion algorithm for the modified key size. FeW based compression function plays a vital role to enhance the efficiency of HeW. We test the hash output for randomness using the NIST statistical test suite and test the avalanche effect, bit variance and near collision resistance. We also give the security estimates of HeW against differential cryptanalysis, length extension attack, slide attack and rotational distinguisher.
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INtroDuctIoN
Last two decades will be commemorated as a revolutionary period in the field of information technology. There is a sharp increase in the usage of internet in mobile applications and shopping through e-commerce portals. We need to secure the internet data traffic to boost the confidence of common people and thereby achieving the dream goals like digital India movement 1 by Government of India. Hash function plays an important role in authentication of data traffic over the internet. Hash functions are mainly intended to ensure the integrity of data in cryptographic applications 2 . But there is other usage of hash functions in speeding up the search of data in look-up tables 3 . Hash function takes an arbitrary length input message and converts it into a fixed size output 4 . The outcome is known as the message digest and works like a thumb print for the intended message. Any single bit difference in the input should result in approximately 50 per cent change in output bits.
Hash functions were introduced by Diffie and Hellmen in 1970 and most of the hash designs were based on block ciphers. The first hash function was based on block cipher DES 5 . There are hundreds of new hash functions published since their evolution 6, 7 . The widely used hash functions are MD5 8, 9 and SHA-1 family 10 . NIST announced SHA-3 competition for selecting a secure and efficient hash function. In 2012, sponge based construction Keccak was selected as SHA-3 standard
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. The design of hash functions can be divided into three categories: hash function based on block ciphers, hash function based on arithmetic functions and dedicated hash functions 12 . The majority of cryptographic hash functions lies in dedicated hash function category.
In the process of designing a secure and efficient hash function, we should make use of the cryptographic components that are well reviewed over the years as well as efficient to implement in software and hardware 3, 13 . Block ciphers have a long fascinating history and data encryption standard (DES) is the first established block cipher. There are much clear security definitions to prove the security claims for a block cipher and we can utilise the design and evaluation effort of a block cipher 5 . Therefore, we have used the lightweight block cipher FeW 14 in the compression function to increase the efficiency without compromising the security. Since, the key expansion algorithm in block ciphers is not designed very carefully, it may lead to an attack on block cipher based hash function. We need a strong key schedule for the block cipher which can be used to design a compression function. Therefore, we modified the key size of block cipher to 64-bit and provide a stronger key expansion algorithm for FeW used in HeW.
lIGHtWeIGHt BlocK cIPHer: FeW
FeW is a lightweight block cipher with 64-bit block size and 80/128 bits key size proposed by Kumar 14 , et al. It is based on Feistel-M structure which is an admixture of Feistel and generalised Feistel structures. FeW is designed to achieve high efficiency in software based applications. Nemati 15 , e. al. have illustrated that FeW can be implemented in hardware with very small area requirement. It suggests that FeW can also be applied in hardware based platforms.
We now briefly discuss the round function and key expansion algorithm for 64-bit key. Swap function is used after 32 rounds of each iteration.
one round FeW
We divide the 64-bit input block into four branches Fig. 1. 
Key expansion algorithm (FeW Ke )
Block cipher based hash function treats the input message as a key for the underlying block cipher used in the compression function. Any tiny weakness in the key expansion algorithm can lead to a serious attack on the hash function, so we need a stronger key expansion algorithm. We reduce the key size to 64-bit and present the key expansion algorithm of FeW for the 64-bit key which is much stronger than the key expansion algorithm for 80-bit key. We use the modified version of FeW to design the compression function of HeW. We write the 64-bit master key MK as a concatenation of four 16- MK is XOred with a round constant rc. Finally, the 64-bit register is left rotated by 13 bits. After updating the key register, current contents of MK 1 is stored as the subsequent 16-bit round keys. Key expansion algorithm for 64-bit key is given in Fig. 3 .
Swap Function
We have 64-bit output after processing the 64-bit input message and the 64-bit key in each round. After 32 rounds, swap function is used to exchange the current contents in the least significant 32 bits and most significant 32 bits.
merKle-DamGårD aND WIDe-PIPe coNStructIoNS
There are many approved hash construction methods which can be used to design a hash function based on a block cipher [15] [16] [17] . Merkle-Damgård is the basic construction method which is used by the majority of hash function designs 18 . This method uses only one compression function f to compute the hash digest. After padding the arbitrary length input message, it processes the b -bit message block and n -bit  as input and generates the n -bit hash digest after processing all message blocks iteratively. 
round Function (rF)
round Function takes 32-bit input i X in the form of two 16-bit Feistel branches. First, these 2 branches are XOred with two 16-bit round subkeys. Thereafter, it mixes the data between Feistel branches by swapping the least significant bytes of the two branches. Then, S-box S( Table 1) . This method was proposed to counter the weaknesses in MerkleDamgård construction which was prone to the length extension attack. This method uses two compression functions f and g to compute the hash digest. After padding the arbitrary length message, first function f is used to iteratively process the b -bit message block and w -bit  to generate w -bit output. After processing the complete message, second function g takes w -bit input to generate the n -bit message digest.
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ProPoSeD HaSH FuNctIoN: HeW
We use Wide-pipe construction method to design our proposed hash function HeW. Message block size and chaining variable size are to be of same length ( 2n -bit) to generate the n -bit hash digest. compression function takes two inputs (512-bit message block i m and 512-bit chaining variable 1 i h − ) and outputs a 256-bit hash digest, where initial value of chaining variable is fixed as
Padding rule
HeW iteratively processes the 512-bit input message blocks. The length of input message may not be a multiple of 512, so we need to pad 20 the arbitrary length input message to make it a multiple of 512. If the message length is a multiple of 512 then we add one dummy padding block to the message. Suppose length of an input message M is  bits. We append the bit '1' at the end of message M , after that we append ( )
bits and finally the bit '1' is appended at the end of padding. We now have a padded message m whose length is a multiple of 512.
Parsing
We divide the input padded message m in t blocks of size 512-bit each as follows:
We process one 512-bit message block i m at a time iteratively.
compression Function
In each iteration of compression function F , we process the 512-bit message block i m by dividing it into the eight 64-bit words is applied on each 64-bit word. After processing the last 512-bit message block, the most significant 256-bit is stored as hash digest of the message. Figure 4 gives the processing of one message block using HeW.
Hash construction
Compression function of HeW takes chaining variable 1 i h − and message block i m as inputs in each iteration. Compression function updates the chaining variable to i h after each iteration. After processing all of the t message blocks, the most significant 256 bits are received as the hash digest for the input message M as follows (Algorithm 1):
aNalYSIS
Software and hardware performance of HeW is presented here. We also discuss the statistical analysis of HeW and differential cryptanalysis, length extension attack, slide attack and rotational attack on the compression function of HeW.
Software Performance
We have used an Intel(r) core(TM) i7-3770 cPu @3.40 GHz processor with 8 GB rAM and 64-bit operating system for benchmarking. We run the code of HeW and SHA-256 several times for three different size data files and calculated the throughput as average running time in MB/Sec. We show the performance comparison of HeW and SHA-256 in in hardware with very small area requirements. It will be practically implemented using 125 number of slices and 264 look up tables (LuT). We have used FeW eight times in parallel in compression function of HeW with reduced key size (64-bit). reduction in the key size will not have much effect on its performance. We estimate that HeW can be efficiently implemented in hardware with a maximum of 1000 slices and 2112 look up tables. This seems to be a good number in terms of hardware performance.
NISt randomness tests
Hash digest for any arbitrary length message must satisfy the randomness properties 21 . We test the random nature of hash digest using NIST Statistical Test Suite SP800-22 22 . We need 100 different files and each file should contain approximately 10 lakh bits for testing the randomness. We process each message and get a 256-bit hash output for the intended message. To generate the required 10 lakh bits, we keep on applying the hash function HeW until we get the 10 lakh bits in the output file. We have the following results (Table 3 ) on 100 files using the NIST suite for the 5 basic randomness tests.
Near-collision resistance
If two different input messages generate the almost same hash value, then this can lead to a collision attack 23 . If it is computationally hard to find two different messages whose hash output differ in the small number of bits then hash function is called near-collision resistant. We checked the nearcollision resistance of HeW by generating the large number of input files. We have generated 100,000 random input message files and calculated their hash value using HeW. We selected two random files from the hash digest lot and calculate their hamming distance. We can choose two files out of 100,000 files in 100000 We got approximately 99 per cent of the files having the hamming distance range between 128 20 ± which indicates that these won't lead to any near-collision attack. The hamming distance between two files needs to be really small viz. up to 16-bit to generate a near collision. Hence, we can say that HeW is resistant to near-collision attack.
avalanche effect
Avalanche criterion states that if we change 1 -bit in the input then there must be an approximate 50 per cent change in the output bits 23 . We tested the Avalanche effect on the output of HeW. We started with a 1024-bit message M 0 which is shown in Appendix B.
For Table 4 . We plotted the hamming distance range of 1024 files for 256-bit hash digest in Fig. 5 which shows that they are almost uniformly distributed i.e., change in one bit of the input carries 50 per cent change in the hash digest.
Bit Variance test
Bit variance test is one of the statistical tests for testing the random nature of the binary data. This test measures the impact for change in the input message bits on the digest bits. A variable length input is transformed to a 256-bit hash digest using HeW. If there is a change in one or some of the input bits, then impact of this change on each of the output bit should be uniform 23 . We took the same set of 1025 messages which we have used to measure the avalanche effect. We got the 256-bit hash output for each of the 1025 messages. For each bit position in the hash digest, we calculate the probability of this bit being 1 . If the probability, ( ) ( )
for all digest bits 1, ..., 256 i = then we assured that HeW passes the bit variance test. Since it is computationally infeasible to consider all input message bit changes, we have considered the results only for 1025 files, viz. We plotted the probability for each of the bits (256-bit) in Fig. 6 and observed that average probability of 1's is approximately 0.50. This indicates that HeW passes the bit variance test.
Differential cryptanalysis
Differential attack is the basic cryptanalysis technique used on block ciphers. It was the first successful attack applied on DES by Biham and Shamir 24 , which reduced the key search complexity of DeS than the exhaustive search. We used the probabilistic relationship between the input and output differences of a cipher to mount this attack. We analysed the components of a cipher to construct a high probability trail by joining several one round relations. We used lightweight block cipher FeW to design the hash function HeW. Security proof of FeW is provided by Kumar 14 , et.al. which shows that FeW is secure against differential cryptanalysis. It is proved that differential attack on FeW cannot be applied beyond 14 rounds. We have theorem 1 for the bound on the number of active S-boxes in any three rounds of FeW.
We used the technique of counting the minimum number of active S-boxes in a differential trail 25, 26 . HeW uses single 4 4 S × -box inside the compression function. The maximum differential probability in one S-box application 14 FeW block. We start with a non-zero difference in a 4-bit nibble within one 64-bit message block. After applying key expansion algorithm, it is guaranteed that the non-zero difference in any 4-bit nibble will be used as a round subkey after 2 rounds. We do not count the S-boxes which are activated during the key expansion. We considered the effect of one 4-bit non-zero nibble only. We counted the number of active
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FeW blocks which are shown in the Fig. 7 and Table 6 . We also have the following theorem for chosen plain-text pairs to distinguish the most significant 64-bit of the hash digest. This bound ensures that differential attack cannot be applied to the hash function HeW. Figure 6 . the probability of the bit position.
BIT VArIANce TeST
PrOBABILITy OF 1'S BIT POSITIONS
length extension attack
If we used hash function as a message authentication code (MAC), then length extension attack can lead to forgery attack against MAc's. This attack was devised for MD5 hash algorithm which process the n -bit message and n -bit  in one iteration and finally generates n -bit hash digest 18 . For a message M , we get padded message as . We now calculated the hash value of the extended message, which will be a valid MAC for the message ' m . To prevent this attack, we can use wide-pipe mode of hash construction which takes 2n -bit  and 2n -bit message as input and n -bit hash digest is generated. HeW takes two inputs (512-bit  and 512-bit message block) and outputs 256-bit hash digest. In case of hash function HeW, length of the hash output is half of the length of  , therefore we conclude that length extension attack cannot be applied on HeW.
Slide attack
Slide attack was proposed for block ciphers and it is used to recover the key in a block cipher 27 . It exploits the weakness in the key schedule of a block cipher and construct a slid pair using the similarity in the round keys. We have used the block cipher FeW to design the hash function HeW, so we need to consider the security from slide attack. There are two types of possible slide attacks. The first kind of slide attack applies sliding on round transformation, while the second kind of attack applies sliding on message block. There are certain preventive measures used in FeW to counter this attack. The first layer of security is the use of round constant in the key expansion algorithm. Secondly, we imbibe a 16-bit left rotation in HeW which is another measure to prevent the slide attack. We, therefore conclude that slide attack cannot be applied to HeW.
rotational Distinguisher
Rotational distinguisher was proposed to analyse the ArX based structures
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. This attack has been less effective on the designs using S-box and MDS type layers in their round function 27 . There is an application of 4x4 S-box in the round function of HeW. This attack can work for HeW, if the rotation amount is a multiple of the size of the S-box (i.e. 4). The rotational value other than 4 will be destroyed by the application of 4x4 S-box. If we take the rotational value as 4, then rotational pair will be further destroyed by the application of nibble permutation layer on 16-bit branches inside round function and 16 bits rotation after every round. We, therefore conclude that rotational distinguisher cannot be effectively applied to our hash function HeW.
coNcluSIoN
A new hash function HeW which is based on a lightweight block cipher is proposed in this paper. The compression function of HeW is built using a software oriented lightweight block cipher FeW which can also be implemented in hardware efficiently. The collision resistance bound for HeW is 2 128 , which is better than present security recommendations of 2
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. We have presented the analysis of HeW for differential attack, length extension attack, slide attack and rotational distinguisher. We applied NIST test suite on the data generated using HeW and it passes the randomness tests. It also passed other tests including avalanche effect, bit variance test and near-collision resistance. Software efficiency of our design is better than SHA-256. The compression function of MD4 and SHA-1 family are based on Merkle-Damgård construction which is prone to the length extension attack. Therefore, our proposed scheme can work as a better alternative to the MD4 and SHA-1 family in terms of security and efficiency. 
